U.S, Iran Stand Off: Gulf, Development and its Impact on India

Geographically, the Gulf is India’s extended neighborhood and the only link with the no-less vital Central Asia, with Pakistan denying this country transit rights and Afghanistan having sunk into chaos. Historically, a relationship between the subcontinent and the Gulf goes back to ancient, pre-Islamic days. Britain controlled the Gulf littoral tightly because of its overwhelming strategic importance for the defence of India, the brightest jewel in the crown. Remarkably, however, this control was exercised not from London but from Calcutta (now Kolkata) first and then New Delhi. Instability in Iraq and the threat of the repetition of Iraqi episode in Iran, endangered the India’s strategic concerned in the West Asian region as a whole. India’s emerging closer ties towards dramatic nuclear agreement with the United Stats questioned, its historical and cultural relationship with Iran and the Gulf in the context of growing India’s energy demands. Despite of a significant convergence of interest between India and the United States on several issues, India is still very much dependent on the Iran and Gulf for its multidimensional concerns of energy, workers, trade and security. India’s pluralistic, democratic and the multi-ethnic nature of its unique feature must not be compromised only for the sake of newly aligned strategic relation with the United States (and Israel). India will have to balance its relationship between the old and new friends. One can not develop one’s relation with the later at the expense of former.

Geographically, the Gulf is India’s extended neighborhood and the only link with the no less vital Central Asia, with Pakistan denying this country transit rights and Afghanistan having sunk into chaos. Historically, a relationship between the subcontinent and the Gulf goes back to ancient, pre-Islamic days. Britain controlled the Gulf littoral tightly because of its overwhelming strategic importance for the defence of India, the brightest jewel in the crown. Remarkably, however, this control was exercised not from London but from Calcutta (now Kolkata) first and then New Delhi. Even after the end of the British rule in the subcontinent, the Reserve Bank of India was the currency issuing authority in the Gulf; in the mid-1950s this arrangement was terminated at the instance of India, not of the littoral states. The discovery of oil in the early years of the twentieth century had boosted the Gulf’s strategic and economic importance. Since the first oil shock of 1973, to say nothing of the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 and the first Gulf War in 1991, it has swiftly increased and is at a very high pitch today amidst the brisk competition between China, India, Japan and South Korea for securing oil and gas.

Two events in 1978 and 1979—the installation of the Islamic regime under Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in support of the pro-Soviet Marxist regime in Kabul—complicated India’s relations with West Asian countries. From the India perspective, theses two events and the Iran-Iraq War changed the balance of power in West Asia by weakening Iran as a regional power and a potential supporter of Pakistan, a situation favorable to India. At the same time, proxy superpower competition in Afghanistan strengthened the hand of India’s adversary Pakistan by virtue of the military support Pakistan received from the United States, China, and Arab states led by Saudi Arabia. In the 1980s, India performed a delicate diplomatic balancing act. New Delhi took a position of neutrality in the Iran-Iraq War, maintained warm ties with Bagdhad, and built workable political and economic relations with Tehran despite misgivings about the foreign policy goals of the Khomeini regime. India managed to improve relations with West Asian countries that provided support to the Afghan mujahideen and Pakistan by redirecting India petroleum purchases to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Countries. New Delhi, which traditionally had had close relations with Kabul, condemned the Soviet invasion only in the most perfunctory manner and provided diplomatic, economic, and logistic support for the Marxist regime.

In the early 1990s, India stepped back from its staunch anti-Israeli stance and support for the Palestinian cause. Besides practical economic and security considerations in the post-cold war International System, domestic politics played a role in this reversal. In December 1991, India voted with the UN majority to repeal the UN resolution equating Zionism with racism. In 1992, following the example of the Soviet Union and China, India established diplomatic relations with Israel. Recently, India has improved relation with Israel and United States rapidly. Indo-US nuclear deal of 18 July 2005 is very clear indication of this particular nature of relationship of both.

U.S, Iran Stand Off: Implication on India

After the second Gulf war 2003, Iranian Nuke issue has become the dominant issue in the international politics. It seems to be challenge to the entire world community and particularly to the Washington statecraft in order to manipulate the issue in accordance with the protection and promotion of its (U.S.A) vital national interest in this specific region. The Bush, white House issued its latest National Security Strategy Doctrine and identifies Iran as the “single country” that poses the greatest danger to the U.S. today. United States questions on the credibility, legitimacy, sources and the intention of the Iranian nuke as well as the regime of Iran as it had done in the Iraq episode. United State President, Junior Bush advocates that all options are on the table and military option is one of them. Iran argues as a NPT signatory that it has inalienable rights to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purpose (Article 4 of NPT) and to that it has the “right to participate in, the fullest exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for peaceful uses of energy. There is no doubt about the legitimacy of the Iranian Nuclear Program and development of nuclear energy for the peaceful purposes.

India’s twice vote in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), made the burning issue in the domestic politics on its stand and questioned whether it is pragmatic sift in its foreign policy or it’s a bandwagon with U.S. because of forthcoming Indo-US nuclear deals on the expense of civilizational linked Indo-Iran relationship, a reference to the interactions of Persian and Indus Valley civilations over a period of millennia.. India voted twice against Iran in IAEA on September 24, 2005 and subsequently on February 2 and March 3, 2006. India’s stands as Prime Minister Manmohan Singh explain that Iran had undertaken international obligations voluntarily- both the obligations of membership in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the undertaking to suspend its sensitive nuclear activist- and should abide by its commitments. He also noted concerns about the origins of fabricated uranium hemispheres, a thinly veiled reference to Pakistan.

A July 2005 Joint Statement resolved to established a Indo-US “global partnership” through increased cooperation on economic issues, on energy and the environment, on democracy and development, on non-proliferation and security, and on high-technology and space . U.S. policy is to isolate Iran and to ensure that its nuclear program is used for purely civilian purposes. India has never shared U.S. assessments of Iran as an aggressive regional power. In January 2003, then Iranian president Mohammed Khatami visited New Delhi as a chief guest at India’s Republic Day parade. During his visit, important energy deals were signed and a strategic partnership was established between both countries. In its annual report, the Ministry claims, “ The Year 2004-2005 saw further deepening and consolidation of India-Iran ties,” with increased momentum of high-level exchanges and institutional linkages between their National Security Councils. However, the Indian government rejected any attempts to link the two issues, and opposition and leftist Indian political parties denounced the remarks as a serious affront to India’s sovereignty. The Indian government has made clear that it does not wish to see a new nuclear weapons power in the region and, in this context, it has aligned itself with international efforts to bring Iran’s controversial nuclear program into conformity with Non-Proliferation Treaty and IAEA provisions.

At the same time, India’s traditional status as a leader of the nonalignment movement and its friendly linked with Tehran, have presented difficulties for Indian policymakers. There also exist in India influential leftist and opposition parties which maintain a high sensitivity toward indications that India being made a junior partner of the United States. Theses political forces have been critical of proposed Indo-US civil nuclear cooperation and regularly insist that India’s closer relations with the United States should not come at the expense of positive ties with Iran. The current India National Congress-led coalition government has thus sought to maintain a careful balance between two sometimes conflicting policy objectives. India’s main opposition, the Bharatiya Janata Party, has voiced its approval of the present government’s policy toward Iran’s nuclear program.

Both India and Iran have strong convergence of interest in different aspect. Iran sees India as a strong partner that will help Tehran to avoid strategic isolation, particular at a moment when Tehran has been designated a member of the “Axis of Evil”. Tehran also sees India as helping it to break out of the anti-Iran pincer allegedly created by the United States in the region, and as an ally against Arab nationalism and extremist Wahhabite Islam. For India, the establishment of a strong relationship with Iran is part of wider effort to pursue India’s interests pragmatically and patiently with all significant states and especially with those in India’s neighborhood. India also regards the Iranian connection as serving a variety of tangible and specific Indian interest. Perhaps most important, the nexus with Iran is seen as helping India with its energy needs. As the fourth largest economy ( in terms of Purchasing Power Parity) in the world, and one almost 70 percent dependent on foreign oil for its needs, India’s preferred choice for the transit for natural gas from Central Asia, Until such time as the developments in Pakistan and Afghanistan stabilize.

Additionally, for India, obviously, is the utility of the relationship in terms of India’s rivalry with Pakistan. In this respect, the Iran nexus is seen as facilitating Indian efforts to contain and encircle Islamabad, an opportunity seen as deriving in part from Pakistan’s weakened posture in Afghanistan. At the same time, the Indo-Iranian relationship sends a message to Washington that U.S. ties with Pakistan entail costs and one of them is strengthened Indo-Iranian nexus. India’s long-term program to deepen and widen its influence in the Indian Ocean region is depending on the Indo-Iran good relation. India’s ties with Iran would also have implication on the pursuit of Indian national interest in Afghanistan and, more broadly, in Central Asia and Caspian Basin. In Central Asia, ties with Iran will be helpful in gaining India access to markets, energy, and potential client states. India, unlike has no direct land access to Central Asia and the Caspian Basin. Last but not least, the Iran relationship is helpful in illustrating India’s willingness to live amicably with the Muslim world.

Notwithstanding, these connections, India and Iran had always friendly friendship. Iran has always been prompt in coming to assist Pakistan, whenever there were hostilities between India and Pakistan. Both in 1965 and 1971, Pakistan had benefited from Iranian largesse though it could not put into proper usage. Pakistan Air Force received German made F 86 Sabres after the 1965 war from Iran. Islamabad also received a squadron of F5 fighter from Iran during the Bangladesh war. Interestingly, when India tested nuclear weapons in May 1998 and Pakistan followed suit in a few days. The Iranian response to these two tests was noteworthy. After the Indian tests, President Khatami declared that he was concerned about the aggravation of the security situation and expressed fears of the escalation of arms race. However, when Pakistan tested weapons after a few days, the Iranian reaction was totally different. The Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharaazi rushed to Islamabad to congratulate Pakistan on its achievement of exploding the first Muslim bomb. But a few people, by a selective citation of events have been trying to prove that Iran is an “all-weather friend”. While the Iranians bailed out India in the 1993 UNHRC summit, the same Iran, along with other OIC members in the 2003 Putrajaya summit, condemned in harsh terms the democratically held elections in Jammu and Kashmir.

India and GCC

India and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has strong economic and cultural relations. India’s interests in the Gulf include the safety and security of over four and half million Indian migrant workers residing in the GCC states, and continued supply of oil and gas from the region. GCC combined Saudi Arabia, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain. Indo-Saudi relation strengthened when the Saudi King was honored at India’s national Republic Day celebrations, which was first visit of a Saudi monarch to India since King Saud’s brief visit to the subcontinent in 1955. Relations subsequently froze, as Riyadh sided with Washington during the Cold War, and New Delhi drifted closer to Moscow. Saudi-Indian ties strained further after the Indian government failed to condemn the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan while the Saudi government helped bankroll the opposition Afghan mujahideen. However, with the Cold War over, such impediments to Saudi-Indian relations evaporated. During the state visit, king Abdullah and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed an Indo-Saudi “Delhi Declaration” calling for a wide-ranging strategic partnership, putting energy and economic cooperation on overdrive, and committing to cooperate against terrorism.

The two countries have significant interests beyond oil. While India is nor a Muslim-majority country, it still hosts the second-largest Muslim population in the World, a constituency that remains interested in Saudi Arabia as the site of the holy shrines at Mecca and Medina. New Delhi has also cultivated Riyadh for strategic reasons. To India strategists, any ally that can act as a counterweight to Pakistan in the Islamic world is significant. Initially, New Delhi sought to cultivate Tehran, but such efforts stumbled in recent years as the Islamic has adopted an increasingly aggressive anti-Western posture. Saudi Arabia now fills that gap. Indeed Iranian nuclear ambitions have helped draw New Delhi and Riyadh closer.

India has had social and mercantile contact with the region comprising the seven Emirates, which now from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), since at least 3000 B.C. The relationship between India and UAE enjoyed a strong and friendly relationship based on historical contacts, shared traditions and values. People-to-peoples contacts and barter trade for clothes and spices from India in exchange for dates and pearls from the region have existed for centuries. Sharjah and Dubai were (is) the main hubs for trade with the western coast of India and in particular, the Malabar Coast. Following the accession of H.H. Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan as the Ruler Abu Dhabi in 1966 and the rapid development of Abu Dhabi thereafter and subsequently of the other Emirates, after the creation of the federation in 1971, India-UAE relations flourished. Today UAE is home to over one million Indians. A large Indian expatriate community resides and engages in the UAE in economically productive actives.

The relationship has evolved into a significant partnership in the economic and commercial sphere with UAE emerging as the second largest market globally for India products. At the same time Indians have emerged as important investors within the UAE and India as an important export destination for the UAE manufactured goods. Indo-UAE trade, valued at US$180 million per annum in the 1970s, is today valued over$18 billion. This emergence of UAE as a re-export centre is reflected in our growing trade. The bilateral trade has shown significant growth over the past few years with our exports to UAE for the period April 2006-February 2007 being US $10,671.88 million as compared to US $ 7,331.38 million in the same period in 2005-6. India’s imports, from UAE for the same period was US$ 7,500.61 million while it was US$ 3,787.91 million in the same period in 2005-6. Total trade for the period April 2006-Februaly 2007 which is favoring India was US $ 3,171.27 million and for the same period in 2005-6 was$11,119.29 billion. The major items of India’s exports to UAE have have been RMG cotton including accessories, gems & jewelry, manmade yarn, fabrics, manufacturers of metals, cotton yarn, marine products, machinery &instruments, plastic &linoleum products, tea and meat & preparations. Similarly, major items of imports from UAE include petroleum and petroleum products, gold & silver, metal ores & metal scrap, sulphur and unroasted iron sited India to examine Anti Aircraft L-7—40.

An Indo-Bahrain historical relation is no exception in the West Asian region. Indian nationals’ accounts 300,000 of the Kingdom’ total population of 750,000. In the high-level meeting held after a gap of nine years, both the nations agreed to hasten the proposed Memorandum of Understanding for cooperation in provision of better health and medical services in the Kingdom. The draft proposed by the kingdom’s Ministry of Health covers training, research and development, hospital policies and procedures, health insurance, food and drug administration and traditional and alternative medicine in November 2007. The two sides agreed to promote joint ventures in manufacturing industries like petrochemicals, aluminum, iron and steel, Information Technology, financial services, insurance, professional training and medical services. Bahrain agreed to look into the Indian proposal for recognition of academic and professional degrees awarded by Indian universities and institutions in accordance with the regulations of the kingdom’s Ministry of Education. It was decided to hold the fifth session of the committee in New Delhi in November 2009.

India and Oman are linked by geography, history and culture. 50 years of Indo-Oman diplomatic ties were celebrated from January 2005 to February 2006 with a number of unique events and functions to emphasize the historic and varied nature of the bilateral relations. Both countries signed Treaty of Friendship (1953), Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Joint Cooperation for Combating Crime (1996), and Extradition Treaty and MoU on cooperation on Audit Services (2004). Indians constitute the largest expatriate community living in Oman. The contribution of Indians to the development of Oman, particularly in the fields of commerce, healthcare, education, horticulture, finance, construction and communication is widely acknowledged There are 15 Indian schools in the Sultanate. All schools follow CBSE (Central Board of Secondary Education) pattern, except one, which is affiliated to the KSB (Kerala State Board).

Emerging Indo-Kuwait relation is also significant. Indians are among the largest and most vibrant expatriate nationals in Kuwait. Their contribution especially in the development of its trade health care and education is commendable. Remittances from these constitute a significant contribution to the Indian economy. There are over 5 lakh Indians living and working in Kuwait whose presence in itself plays a positive role in fostering India-Kuwait relations. Recently, the Government of India has taken several initiatives and measures to encourage foreign investment inflows, particularly the flow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Major thrust areas include infrastructure development, particularly energy, power, telecom and township development.

India and Qatar have been enjoying friendly bilateral relations since the beginning. Both countries share many interests and have common views on major global and regional issues. There are about 1.5 lakh Indian workers in the country. Both countries signed an Additional protocol to the 1985 bilateral agreement on the Regulation of Employment of Indian Manpower between the two countries in November 2007. Already the two countries co-operated and collaborated in many ways, including training of personnel, joint exercises and services to service information sharing. Both countries decided to sign bilateral defense agreement, similarly Qatar had defence co-operation accords with such countries as the US, the UK and France.

It is important to mention here the changing perception of India and Indians in the Gulf. While characteristics such as India being the world’s largest democracy, home to 150 million Muslims, fourth largest economy in the world in terms of purchasing power parity and world’s largest provider of peacekeepers are well documented, India’s strategic importance is being viewed in what the country is shaping to be fourth largest consumer energy by 2010, which is indicative of the economy’s momentum: hi-tech plans to develop super-computers, complete nuclear fuel cycle facilities and placement of own satellites in orbit: replicating IT success in biotechnology, biogenetics and pharmaceuticals: and more importantly, a strategic partner of the United States, which is willing to share nuclear technology for civilian use and even share roles in joint space missions.

Bahrain-based intellectual Abdullah Madani wrote in his column about the Gulf’s “recognition of India’s advancement in numerous vital areas and its political willingness to learn and benefit from India. This is a new Gulf rhetoric, given the prevailing preconceived idea in the region that India is no more than a backward nation that is only capable of supplying poor quality goods and unskilled labour. In fact, there is now a sound base for the two sides to establish a long-term strategic partnership.Of course, there is a pervasive feeling all around that economic sense is common sense. The GCC has finally realized the significance of reinforcing and expanding cooperation with India, while maintaining its strong ties with Pakistan, a key element that was missing in its diplomacy armour in the past. This marked a big leap in the GCC’s new “Look East” policy. In April 2004, the GCC chambers of commerce and industry called for prioritizing economic cooperation with Asian countries with large populations and developing economies, especially Indian and China.

Changing policies in GCC

Notwithstanding, these positive relation between the India and GCC, has only the bright aspects in the relationship. September 11 episode, has posed a new kinds of threat in the international relation and these multilateral relation is not exception. Gulf countries started implementing very strict policies regarding expatriates and increasing unemployment of their own nationals. In order to meet the challenge, the GCC countries are taking various measures, including nationalization of the workforce. Jobs in many sectors are no longer open to expatriates, especially in Oman and Bahrain, which have lesser oil revenues, growing unemployment and a willingness among nationals to accept occupations dominated so far by foreigners. In Oman’s private sector, the number of expatriates has fallen by 24.4 per cent since January 2003. Statistics reveal that more than 134,000 expatriates left their jobs over the last three years. By 2004, the country’s single largest industrial enterprise, Oman LNG, achieved 73 per cent Omanisation of its staff through a plan to initially use foreign expertise and then train Omanis to take over. The total number of expatriate workers in the private sector with valid work permits stood lower at 415,135 at the end of July 2005 compared with 549,338 at the end of January 2003.

The government has banned expatriates from selling and transporting fruit and vegetables in several regions of the country. Expatriates cannot engage in frankincense trade or in the sale of mobile phones in certain cities. Running beauty parlors and photo studios is now for nationals only and even the sale of ‘abayas’-the traditional Arabic full-length robe for women-is reserved for Omani women. The government also intends to restrict the selling of perfumes, gifts, textiles and accessories and the running of cyber cafes to its nationals. Since January 2003, the number of expatriates engaged in agriculture and fishing sector, fell 32 per cent, from 66,000 to 45,000 in July 2005. More than 59,000 expatriate workers left the wholesale, retail trade and car repairs sector, making the total number of expatriates working in these areas as low as 89,461 as against 148,516 in January 2003.

According to an official study, up to 20,000 locals were unemployed in Bahrain. Further, a survey revealed that almost 70 per cent of Bahraini men and women have no qualms about taking on domestic work. The survey found most willing to work as babysitters, nurses for the elderly, drivers or gardeners. However, there was a strange twist-only 10 percent of respondents were willing to employ Bahrainis in those positions due to inadequate skills, cultural problems and “security threat”.

Saudi Arabia is no exception either. Facing a population explosion and growing unemployment, the government decided in 2003 to reduce its foreign workforce by more than half in 10 years. Following a study, the Interior Ministry’s Manpower Council announced a 20 per cent ceiling on the number of expatriate workers and their dependents in the kingdom. The directive also meant that workers from a single country would account for no more than 10 per cent of the workforce by 2013. According to Saudi Interior Minister Prince Nayef, “The employment of expatriates should not be at the expense of Saudi job-seekers. More than 100,000 young Saudis enter the job market annually.” He added that expatriates were also increasing the government’s burden in terms of “pressure on infrastructure facilities and increasing crimes.

As part of its ‘cultural diversity policy’, the UAE announced in 2003 that it intends to scrutinize visa applications of Asian workers because of official concern about their growing numbers in the country, its reliance on foreign workers and its changing demography. Officials stress that there is no specific quota for any nationality, but, when a company applies for an employment visa for a new worker, the ministry checks its records. If it found that the majority of those waiting to be recruited are of the same nationality, the company is asked to recruit nationals from other countries.

Such was the concern that the then UAE President, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan, said, “This imbalance continues to pose a grave problem which threatens the stability of our society and the prospects for future generations.” In line with this approach, officials even suggested that they were not averse to making life less comfortable for expatriates to stem the flow.



References:

Alam Anwar, (eds.2007), India and West Asia in the Era of Globalization, New Delhi: New Century Publications.
Berlin L. Donald (Oct.2004) India-Iran Relations: A Deepening Entente”, Asia-Pacific Center for security Studies.
Dietl Gulshan, Girijesh Pant, P.C. Jain (eds.2007), Contemporary Saudi Arabia and The Emerging Indo-Saudi Relations, Delhi: Shipra publications.
Manish (2005), “Iran and IAEA”, Strategy Analysis, Vol.29, No.3.
Mitra Pramit and Vibhuti Hate (2006), “India-Iran Relations: Changing the Tone?”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, No.92.
Pant V. Harsh (Fall, 2006), “Saudi Arabia Woos China and India”, Middle East Quarterly, Vol.13, No.4.
Pasha, A.K. (2007), “Indian Perceptions on Persian Gulf”, World Focus, Issue, 335-336.
Ray Takeyh (Fall 2003), “Iranian Options: Pragmatic Mullah and America’s Interests”, The National Interest.
Sisodia, N.S and Ashok K. Behuria (eds., 2007), West Asia in Turmoil, Implications for Global Security, New Delhi: Academic Foundation.

India, Israel and Russia: An Emerging Triangle

The end of Cold War restructured the bipolar international system into the unipolar one and led to the readjustment as well as revisit to the foreign policy doctrine of its unit in order to protect and promote the national interest in new context. India was not exception. While re-establishing diplomatic relation with Israel and opening the door for the closer relation with the West particularly to the United States, India crossed the traditional idealistic rubicon and adopted pragmatic and realistic foreign policy. India and Israel have established considerably good relation in multi-dimensional aspects. Both have improved the trade relation in various fields including agricultural products, medicine, energy, Science and technology etc. They established a joint commission on trade. Both have joint mechanism in the field of combating terrorism as well. India which had the closer and timetested friendship with erstwhile Soviet Union made normal relation with New Russia in accordance with the national interest priories and developed its relation in several aspect as well. At the same time similar experiences of India, Israel and Russia in the field of modernization of defence and cross border terrorism, gave the triangular shape of relationship while recognizing the common interest in different dimension such as defence, security, science and technology, mechanism to combat terrorism.

India, Israel and Russia: An Emerging Triangle

India, Israel and Russia: An Emerging Triangle


The end of Cold War restructured the bipolar international system into the unipolar one and led to the readjustment as well as revisit to the foreign policy doctrine of its unit in order to protect and promote the national interest in new context. India was not exception. While re-establishing diplomatic relation with Israel and opening the door for the closer relation with the West particularly to the United States, India crossed the traditional idealistic rubicon and adopted pragmatic and realistic foreign policy. India and Israel have established considerably good relation in multi-dimensional aspects. Both have improved the trade relation in various fields including agricultural products, medicine, energy, Science and technology etc. They established a joint commission on trade. Both have joint mechanism in the field of combating terrorism as well. India which had the closer and timetested friendship with erstwhile Soviet Union made normal relation with New Russia in accordance with the national interest priories and developed its relation in several aspect as well. At the same time similar experiences of India, Israel and Russia in the field of modernization of defence and cross border terrorism, gave the triangular shape of relationship while recognizing the common interest in different dimension such as defence, security, science and technology, mechanism to combat terrorism.

Russia's relation with Israel and Iran

Russia’s Relations with Israel and Iran: Shaping New Dimensions
Priya Ranjan Kumar*

Since the 1990s, Russia and Israel have established considerably good relation in multi-dimensional aspects. Both have improved the trade relation in various fields including agricultural products, medicine, energy, Science and technology etc. They established a joint commission on trade. Both have joint mechanism in the field of combating terrorism as well. Interestingly, on the other hand Russia’s relation with Iran strengthened in different fields which include arms trade, science and technology (nuclear) etc. However, Israel perceives Iran as the threat to its national security because of Iran’s perpetual support to Hezbollah and controversial Iranian Nuclear programme where as Russia’s strategic considerations towards Iran links with the economic security in terms of hard currency. These confronting interests of Russia and Israel towards Iran put Moscow to approach both countries in the new dimensions in order to secure its national interest without sacrificing the vital interests from any of the side.

Since the 1990s, Russia and Israel have established considerably good relation in multi-dimensional aspects. Both have improved the trade relation in various fields including agricultural products, medicine, energy, Science and technology etc. They established a joint commission on trade. Both have joint mechanism in the field of combating terrorism as well. However, Russia has sought to achieve three major goals in the West Asian region. The first is to demonstrate Russia’s renewed power and influence in the region where American influence is on the decline. The second is to increase trade with the nations of the region, so as to buttress to Russian economy, especially its non-energy sectors. The third goal is to minimize Arab, Turkish and Iranian support for the Chechen rebellion against Russian control, which the rebels are carrying out in the name of Islam.[1]

Furthermore, Internationally, despite its economic and social crises, Russia’s policymakers have aimed at relatively modest goal of “a multi-polar system of international relations that reflects the diversity of the present-day world and its diverse interest in a real way.” As Yevgeny Primakov, advocated, “For Russia, the transition to a multi-polar world will create the possibility of diversifying the directions of foreign policy and of developing constructive strategic relations immediately with some influential partners this increases the possibility of a manoeuvre necessary for ensuring the country’s security under the conditions of a resource deficit and of the transition period in the development of our country, which is attended by difficulties”.[2]
Internal factors also drive Russia’s West Asian engagement. The rise of separatist hotspots- foremost among them being the protracted Chechen conflict- has focused its attention on the West Asia’s growing ability to influence politics in Russia as well as in its “near abroad”- the Caucasus and Southern Eurasia. So Russia engages Iran, in part to keep it from aggravating Russia’s escalating struggle with militant Islam in the Caucasus. Russian policymakers began to stress, “Iran can have both stabilizing and a destabilizing role on the Muslim regions of Russia. We need a broad spectrum of co-operation with Iran. The broader the co-operation, the narrower is the possibility of anti Russian actions from extremist forces in Iran”[3]. Russia’s relations with Israel and Iran would be discussed separately in these foreign policy orientations.
Russia’s Relations with Israel
Traditionally, The Union of Socialist Soviet Republic (USSR), the predecessor of Russia was the first power to extend de jure recognition to the state of Israel on 18 May 1948. Although the United States (US) preceded the USSR in endorsing the Jewish State, it had only accorded de facto recognition. However, one can argue that this was a turning point in the Soviet policy towards Israel because of the two strategic and ideological considerations. Strategic considerations focused upon Soviet desire to end Britain’s role and influence from West Asia. Other was ideological consideration whereby the Soviet Union viewed the emerging state of Israel as potentially a true “people’s democracy”. As such, it deserved support in the competition that was taking place between the “socialist and imperialist system”.[4]
Interestingly, this friendly attitude did not last and both sides were responsible for the worsening of relations. Some of the actions taken by Israel in the period between May 1948 and February 1953 impacted negatively upon its relation with the USSR. These included requests for loans and economic aid from the US and voting with the West at the United Nations, notably on Korea in 1950 and on the US Mutual Security Act in 1951. An anti-Soviet tone in the Israeli press may also have caused damage. Other factors, which worsened the relationship, were not directly connected with Israel but rather, emanated from the outbreak of the Cold War. The USSR’s relations with the Western powers or with the Arab States were influenced by Soviet and Arab relation with the West. The USSR viewed itself as the champion workers’ of the world and the centre for the global fight against capitalism and imperialism. It regarded Israel as an ally of the forces that was fighting.[5] Moreover, Suez Canal crisis in 1956 witnessed the deterioration of the relation while the June war of 1967 led to end the diplomatic relationship between the USSR and Israel.
At the same time both maintained good communications through various direct and indirect channels. There was also backdoor diplomacy, for example, in September 1977 two envoys flew from the USSR to hold secret meetings with Prime Minster Menachem Begin and Israeli and Soviet ambassadors were periodically authorised to conduct private meetings in Vienna or other European capitals.[6] Interestingly, Israel never wanted to break off relationship with the USSR because of the substantial Jewish population in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In the late 1980s Mickhail Gorbachev brought about drastic changes in the policy towards Israel. First, in 1986 the Soviet exchanged consular delegations with Israel and by early 1991, it was upgraded as Consulate General and Israel did the same in the USSR. However, only on the eve the Madrid Peace Conference that full diplomatic relation between the two countries was restored in October 1991. The USSR also decided to support the US-led initiative in December 1991 to repeal the 1975 UN General Assembly resolution equating Zionism with racism.[7] The USSR also allowed the resumption of massive Jewish immigration to Israel. Cultural contacts between the two expanded dramatically and many famous Soviet artists, writers and musicians visited Israel. Unpredictably, once Gorbachev stated that the absence of Soviet-Israeli relations was abnormal.[8]
Practically, Russian interests in Israel have been four-fold. The primary interest is economic. The Second major Russian interest is diplomatic. By maintaining good ties with Israel, Russia apparently hopes to keep a door open to the Washington especially when Russia-American ties become strained, as happened during 1994-1996. Thirdly, a close ties with Israel also enabled Russia to play, or at least appeared to play, a major role in the Arab-Israeli peace process. The fourth Russian interest was a cultural one. With more than a million immigrants (constitute approximately 20% of the Israeli population) from the former Soviet Union, almost all of them Russian-speaking, Israel has the largest Russian Diaspora outside the former Soviet Union. There are extensive cultural ties between the two countries, with Israel hosting a large number of Russian artists, pop singers, newspapers, and even cable TV programmes.[9]
The most important area of cooperation between Russia and Israel have been trade and science and technology. Russia has been recognised as one of the priority countries by Israel for promotion of the exports and of the bilateral trade in general. Several agreements were signed in the field of economic and technical cooperation between the two countries. It includes, trade and economic, scientific and technical cooperation, healthcare and medical science, agriculture and associated industries, tourism, postal and electric communication, culture and education civil aviation and prevention of double taxation. Russia and Israel have signed an inter-ministerial Memorandum on Mutual Understanding on Cooperation in the Field of Perfecting of professional and Language Training of Diplomatic Personal on 13 August 1998. On 25 March 1999, they added an intergovernmental Programme of Cultural Cooperation. They also negotiated an agreement on investment protection, in the area of standardization on the governmental level.
In addition, the other areas of potential cooperation between both countries have been in the transport of energy (particularly oil). Israel has a 42–inch diameter oil pipeline between Eilat on the Red Sea and Ashkelon that was built on the Mediterranean. This is believed to have a capacity of 400,000 b/d, with possible expansion to 1-1.2 million b/d (and 18 million barrels of storage capacity). In 2003, the Eilat-Ashkelon Pipeline Company completed a project that would enable oil to be piped southwards, with the aim of making it available to Russia. The pipeline would enable Russia to sell its oil in South and Southeast Asia with lower shipment costs than those incurred by using the Suez Canal or the proposed Egyptian SUMED (Suez-Mediterranean pipeline) pipeline.[10] In addition, since the early 1990s Israel’s dependence on Russian energy has increased. Following June 2004 meeting between Alexey Miller, the Chairman of Gazprom and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Israel promised to increase import of energy from one percent of its demand to as high as to 25 percent by 2025.[11] Trade between both countries has doubled under Putin and it was close to $1.5 billion in direct trade and over a billion in energy deals. Russia and Israel are working together in heavy industry, aviation, energy, and medicine.

In Strategic aspects, since 1991, the security cooperation between the Russia and Israel blossomed into military cooperation. In December 1995, Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev made an official visit to Israel, meeting Prime Minister Shimon Peres and Chief of Staff Amnon Shahak. He also visited the Ramat David Air Forces, Israel’s state military industries, Yad Vashem (the Holocaust Museum and Memorial), and Yitzhak Rabin’s grave. During his visit, he signed a five-year bilateral agreement for military-technical cooperation (which was extended in 2000). Both signed a Memorandum on Mutual Understanding in Military Cooperation, which envisaged the development of contact between the defence ministries of the two countries.[12] Since then Israel and Russia have pursued military cooperation that envisaged the development of contact between the Defence Ministries of the both countries.[13]

In May 1997, Russian Interior Minister Viktor Kulikov came to Israel on a five-day visit with the purpose of strengthening security cooperation between the two countries in the areas of organized crime and terrorism. Kulikov signed an agreement with Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy for the establishment of a permanent office of the Russian Interior Ministry at the Russian Embassy in Tel-Aviv and the establishment of an office for the Israel’s Interior Ministry at the Israeli Embassy in Moscow. Both countries signed an agreement for joint action to maintain security on airline flights. On 20 June 1997, the Russian arms sale agency, Rozvooruzheniye signed an agreement with Israeli aircraft industries to jointly produce the A-50 radar early warning aircraft (AWACS). Under the agreement, Russia would do 90 percent of the work on the airframe while Israel would supply the radar system. There was also discussion for the joint modernization of Russian MIG-21 and MIG-29 fighter planes.[14]

Cooperation has also extended to the realm of space technology. In 1998 Israel launched the Techsat-2 with the help of a Russian rocket launcher. Photo images were transmitted by EROS-A (Earth Remote Observation System), a commercial satellite made by Israel Aircraft Industries and Launched from Siberia in December 2000. In the spring of 2003, the Russian and Israeli Defence Ministries signed two agreements covering intellectual property, designed in part to protect Russian rights when Israel sells Russian-made platforms with its military technology added to them.[15]

The most visible area of cooperation between Russia and Israel have been in counter-terrorism. Israel was one of the first countries to support Russia after the Beslan tragedy in 2004 where almost 300 people, mostly children, were killed in a hostage standoff with Chechan rebels. “Israel, which has been struggling against terrorism for many years, stands alongside the Russian people and sends its condolences,” Ariel Sharon stated: “There is no justification for terrorism and this is the time for the free, just and humanitarian world to unite and fight this horrific plague, which acknowledges neither borders nor limitations”.[16] This statement was not a break from the past. Since 1999, Israeli officials have stressed the similarity between Chechen and Palestinian Islamist violence and reiterated the need to respond forcefully to terrorism more broadly.

Following an onslaught of terrorist attacks between 1999 and 2004 on Russian apartment buildings, subways, airlines and theatres and inadequate and often bunged responses by security services, Russian intelligence services began serious collaboration with their counterparts in Israel. Though Mossad (Israel’s intelligence agency) officials secretly held meetings with Russians at the Kremlin during Yeltsin’s tenure and Putin’s first years in office, the level of cooperation increased dramatically in the post-Beslan security environment. As Ehud Olmert, then Israel’s Vice Prime Minister, stated in November 2004, “I think there is a growing realization in Russia that they [Russia] have to become more prepared for future terror attacks and that it’s a good idea to compare notes with us [Israeli]”.[17] Senior level talks have focused on three areas: training, border security, and arms. Since 2004, Israeli and Russian anti-terror forces have secretly trained together, and there were plans to hold joint counter-terrorism exercises. The Israeli police, by Russia’s request, also prepared reports detailing alternative responses to the hostage crises at the Nord-Ost Theater and Beslan.

On the issue of border security, Israel has proposed that Russia reform its intelligence gathering and border-protection agencies. Dmitry Kozak, Putin’s envoy to the Northern Caucasus region, had spent the majority of time since his appointment in March shuttling between Russian and Israeli signing counter-terrorism arrangements and arms deals.[18] In November 2005, for example, it was reported that Kozak had negotiated a deal whereby Israel would sell unmanned aerial vehicles to Russia to help patrol the border with Chechnya. Even the tension caused by visit to Russia by Hamas representative in March 2006 did not significantly disrupt counter-terrorism cooperation between the two countries.

Russia’s Relations with Iran
Russia perceived West Asian region as a major source of hard currency.[19] The region’s volatile politics also makes it a lucrative market for Russian arms export, vital to its struggling military-industrial complex. This has led Russia to resuscitate its Cold War patron-client relationships with countries like Syria and Iran. Finally, the convergence of interests between the official government driven by security calculation and those of powerful domestic lobbies over oil and gas has also contributed to Russia’s involvement in the region.[20] However, the multicultural composition of Russian population also became the driving force for Moscow to pursue ties with the Muslim world.
Historically, In the 1960s and 1970s, Iran was the USSR’s third largest trading partner in the developing world, after India and Egypt. Soviet arms were first supplied to the Shah in 1967. Following the refusal by the US, the USSR provided favourable credits for the Isfahan steel plant. This however, did not cause a shift in Iranian proximity from one superpower to the other in the way that the finance and construction of the Aswan dam in Egypt did. Despite some progress in the 1970s, Iran largely remained an American ally in the region. Soviet Union welcomed the Islamic Revolution of 1979, insofar as it was anti-Western. Given its close relations with Iraq, the USSR sold few weapons to Iran during the prolonged Iran-Iraq war. Between 1980and 1983, new weapons sales agreements between the two countries reached $615 million but during 1984-87 they fell to only $5 million.[21] However, after the Iran-Iraq war ended, the international embargo on Iraq pushed the Soviets closer towards Iran. In 1989, the speaker of the Iranian parliament, Hashemi Rafsanjani, signed a framework agreement in Moscow on arms supplies and cooperation in the development of nuclear energy. This was followed by a large increase in deliveries, during 1987-91 totalled $2.1 billion. With the end of the war in Afghanistan and the fall of communism, Russia became a much more attractive source of supply for Iran.[22]
Additionally, over the past decades, Russia’s military cooperation arrangements with Iran have been more extensive and Iran has emerged as the third largest client for Russian arms after China and India. Since the two countries signed a bilateral military-technical cooperation agreement in 1989 (signed with the Soviet Union but inherited by Russia), until 2001 Russia has supplied Iran with equipment and services worth over $4 billion. Among all the Russian clients in West Asia, Russia-Iranian cooperation was the most advanced in terms range of weapons systems sold by Russia and in the scale of technical cooperation. Between 1992 and 2000, Russia sold to Iran three Kilo-class submarines, over 200 T-72 tanks, ten Su-24 and eight MiG aircraft. Moreover, Iran has acquired licenses for the production of T-72C and BMP-2 armoured fighting vehicles. Russia has also provided Iran with a large number of military advisers who have trained its military, including submarine crews, to operate advanced Russian weapons systems and helped set up licensed production arrangements. Russia was suspected of helping Iran in the development of ballistic missile technology. There have been reports that Russia has sold SS-4 SSM technology and assisted in the development of a dual use communications satellite system.[23] A number of Iranian military officers were attending Russian military schools. Many private Russian citizens (some estimate more than 500) were working in Iran and were suspected of providing military-technology related expertise.[24]
In 1995, Russia and Iran signed an agreement that included a $780 million contract to build a light water nuclear reactor at Bushehr. This was project started by a West German consortium in 1974 but halted following the 1979 revolution, which ended the German involvement. About 80 percent of the construction was completed at that time. Bushehr was bombed several times by Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war. The 1995 agreement called for completion of two 1,300-MW pressurized light water units as well as the supply of two modern VVER-440 units.[25] Since then, work has proceeded at Bushehr, but not on any of the other projects agreed on.
Therefore, Russia’s military supplies and cooperation in civilian nuclear energy with Iran have become a source of constant concern and tension in Russia’s relations with Israel and the US. The US government has applied consistent pressure on Russia to reduce or even cancel some of its projects with Iran. In November 2000, the Putin government, however, decided to cancel the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement. The following month, the Russian Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev, paid the first official visit to Tehran since the 1979 revolution. In March 2001, President Khatami visited Russia and President Putin announced that Russia would conclude new arms supply agreements with Iran. A technical-military agreement to this effect was signed in October 2001.[26] At the same time, Presidents Khatami and Putin agreed to expand bilateral cooperation on nuclear power. In November 2001, Russia delivered the first reactor to Iran, and in July 2002 Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom now Rosatom) outlined a plan to build six 1,000-MW reactors in Iran by 2010, including four at Bushehr and two at Akhvaz.[27]
The US strongly opposed to nuclear cooperation project and provided Russia with information pointing to the existence of an Iranian nuclear weapons program. In May 2002, when US Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham met him, Minatom Head Alexander Rumyantsev stated that Bushehr “is not a source of proliferation of nuclear material”.[28] In June 2003, President Putin said that Russia would continue building a nuclear power station for Iran, but demanded that Iran’s nuclear programme would come under stricter international control. This statement was made a day after the Group 8 countries urged both Iran and North Korea to curb their nuclear programs. According to Putin, Russian nuclear cooperation with any country would be “based on the extent to which their programs are open and placed under the control of the IAEA” (International Atomic Energy Agency, the Vienna based nuclear watchdog). In a reference to worries of Russia's rivals he added: “We are categorically opposed to bringing in any problems which could be used for unfair competitions, including on the Iranian market”.[29]
Russian officials have stated that the Bushehr project is consistent with a civil nuclear programme, and deny US accusations that oil-rich Iran has no need for nuclear power and has been secretly trying to acquire atomic weapons. Construction on Bushehr was to be completed by March 2004, but as a result of delays-described as technical-completion was re-scheduled for 2006. In August 2004, Iran said that the plant would start operating in October 2006. In February 2005, Russia and Iran signed an agreement to return spent nuclear fuel from the Bushehr nuclear power plant, a move that paved the way for Iran to have Bushehr become operational. According to the agreement, Russia would provide the fuel needed to run the Bushehr plant, but the spent fuel would be sent back to Russia to ensure that Iran does not extract plutonium, which could be used to make a nuclear bomb.
However, Russian diplomats have been holding bilateral talks with Iranian officials on a proposal they say could defuse the crisis in 2006. The proposal, which won support from other UN Security Council members-including the US-would allow Iran to obtain enriched uranium it says it needs for civilian nuclear power directly from Russia. President Putin has offered qualified support for Iran’s nuclear programme on a visit to Tehran, he stated that “peaceful nuclear activities must be allowed”[30] and cautioned against using force to resolve the dispute over Iran in October 2007. But he was evasive when asked whether the Bushehr nuclear plant Russia is building would be finished on time or if Moscow would supply nuclear fuel. After long discussion with Iran, Russia had delivered its first shipment of nuclear fuel to reactor it is helping to build at Bushehr in Iran[31] in December 2007. Interestingly, the UN has demanded that Iran halt uranium enrichment but has approved the Russian nuclear fuel deliveries.
Israeli Concerns
Israel interprets these Russia’s dealings with Iran as a threat to its national security.[32] If Iran uses the Russian civilian nuclear technology to build a nuclear weapon, it would cause a radical shift in the regional balance of power, possibly catalyzing a regional nuclear arms race (led by Saudi Arabia and Egypt). Such a path would also lead to a nuclear stand-off between Israel and Iran. The issue of Iran looms large over in all areas of Israeli-Russian relations, so much so that Robert O. Freedman, a leading expert on Russian-Israeli relations, believes that Russia is working against Israel on all the major issues.[33] For Israel, a nuclear Iran constitutes an existential threat. It sees the tripartite combination of a radical Islamic regime, long-range missile capability, and nuclear weapons to be extremely dangerous. Due to its small and dense population, Israel is extremely vulnerable to non-conventional attacks. In December 2005, Israel’s Prime Minister Ariel Sharon termed the Iranian program “a grave threat” stressing that Israel “cannot accept a nuclear Iran.[34] This statement was a reflection of a long-held threat perception of a large part of Israel’s strategic community. Indeed, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (1992-95) already perceived “Islamic Iran which was engaged in acquiring a nuclear capability and in sponsoring terror, as Israel’s arch-enemy”.[35]
This stems from the fact the while Vladimir Putin sees his country’s dealings with Iran primarily as an economic issue, Israel views it as a security concern. More than anyone else, Russian was aware that the market for their antiquated nuclear technology was shrinking, and that the $10 billion agreement it signed in July 2002 to provide Iran with six nuclear reactors over the next decade was a deal that was desperate for the Russian nuclear industry.[36]
Moreover Israel's fears are exasperated by the election of Mahmoud Ahmedinejad in June 2005. He has contributed to Israel’s fears by issuing a series of inflammatory statements. On 26 October 2005, paraphrasing a speech made by late Ayatollah Khomeini, he called for “Israel to be wiped off the map”.[37] On 14 December 2005, in a speech that was televised live Ahmedinejad denied that the Holocaust had ever happened, suggesting that Israel’s Jews should be relocated to Europe or even to Alaska. Such statements from high-ranking public officials cannot be dismissed as pure rhetoric; they reflect a policy preference and an Iran strengthened by a nuclear arsenal might pursue such a policy.[38] In addition, Iran was allied with Syria, another state with an anti-US predisposition, and seeks to create a radical Shi’a corridor from Iran to the Mediterranean. According to the US State Department, Iran considered as the most active state sponsor of terrorism.[39]
For Russian, the nuclear issue was not high enough on its list of most pressing security concerns to jeopardize other key interests. Russia prefers the status quo and considers the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran to be an unwelcome one, but not so unwelcome as to place other Russian interests at risk. The Russians appear more concerned about an American intervention that would jeopardize Russian commercial interests; complicate bilateral relations, including those with Israel and the US; cause further regional destabilizations; and set off strategic and economic ripple effects that Russia may be ill equipped to handle.[40] Some in Russian view the Iranian nuclear programme as chiefly aimed at the US and therefore useful in countering growing American influence and adventurism. At the same time, Russian officials understand that the issue was important for its principal interlocutors, namely, the US, the UK, Germany, Germany, and France, and Russia would not want to be cut out of any scheme they propose.
Therefore, in these different confronting perspective of Israel and Russia towards Iran made the relation more suspicious. Israel perceived Russia’s closer relation with Iran as well as Syria the most dangerous for its national security. Whereas Russia’s national interest (economic security) means improved relation with Iran and Syria, particularly in the field of arms trade. These confronting interests of Russia and Israel towards Iran put Moscow to approach both countries in the new dimensions in order to secure its national interest without sacrificing the vital interests from any of the side























End Notes and References:
* Priya Ranjan Kumar, Research Scholar, Centre for West Asia and African Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University New Delhi-110067
[1] For details see, Robert O. Freedman “The Russian Resurgence in the Middle East”, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol.5, No.3, p.19-23.
[2] For details see Primakov Yevgeny (1998), “Russia and the outside World,” International Affairs, 3:
7-13.
[3] Berman, Ilan (2001), “Russia and the Mideast Vaccum”, The Institute for Advanced Strategic & Political Studies, p. 21, htt://www.iasps.org/strategic/strat12.pdf.,
[4] Kazan, Rudyard (2004), “The Israeli-Soviet/Russia Relations”, Defense Magazine, at http://lebarmy.gov.lb/article.asp?In=en&id=4203
[5] Epstein, D. Alek (2007), “Russia and Israel: A Romance Aborted?”, Russian in Global Affairs, Vol.5, No.4, p.181.
[6] Klieman S. Aaron (1990), Israel & The World After 40 Years, Washington: Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defense Publishers, Inc., p.196.
[7] Freedman O. Robert (1995), “Israeli-Russian Relations since the Collapse of The Soviet Union”, Middlle East Journal, Vol. 49, No. 2, p. 234.
[8] Polsky Yury (1994), “Russia’s Policy Towards Israel”, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.28, No. 1, p. 25.
[9] Freedman O. Robert (1998), “Russia and Israel under Yeltsin”, Israel Studies, Vol.3, No. 1, pp.148-49.
[10] Rivlin, Paul (2005), “The Russian Economy and Arms Exports to the Middle East”, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Vol.79, p.42, at http//www.tau.ac.il/jcss/memoranda/memo79.pdf.
[11] Bourtman, Ilya (2006), “Putin and Russia’s Middle Eastern Policy”, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol.10, No.2, pp.2-3.
[12] Antonenko, Oksanam (2001), “Russia’s Military Involvement in the Middle East”, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol.5, No. 1, p. 43.
[13] Freedman O. Robert (1998), “Russia and Israel under Yeltsin”, Israel Studies, Vol.3, No. 1, pp.155.
[14] Ibid, p. 161.
[15] Rivlin, Paul (2005), “The Russian Economy and Arms Exports to the Middle East”, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Vol.79, p.42, at http//www.tau.ac.il/jcss/memoranda/memo79.pdf.
[16] Leyden, Joel, “Israel to Russia: Tears for Children by Islamic Terrorism,” Israel News Agency, 5 September 2004.
[17] Bourtman, Ilya (2006), “Putin and Russia’s Middle Eastern Policy”, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol.10, No.2, pp.3.
[18] Bourtman, Ilya (2006), “Putin and Russia’s Middle Eastern Policy”, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol.10, No.2, pp. 3.
[19] Freedman O. Robert (1997), “Russian and Iran: A Tactical Alliance,” School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) Review, Vol. 17, No. 2, p.97.
[20] Berman, Ilan (2001), “Russia and the Mideast Vaccum”, The Institute for Advanced Strategic & Political Studies, p. 5, htt://www.iasps.org/strategic/strat12.pdf.,
[21] Cordesman H. Anthony and Abraham R. Wigner (1990), The Lessions of Modern War, Vol. II, The Iran-Iraq War, Boulder: Westview Press Inc. p.49
[22] Kam Ephraim (2004), From Terror to Nuclear Bombs: The Significance of the Iranian Threat, Tel Aviv: Ministery of Defense Publishing House and Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, p. 66.
[23] Rivlin, Paul (2005), “The Russian Economy and Arms Exports to the Middle East”, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Vol.79, p. 38, at http//www.tau.ac.il/jcss/memoranda/memo79.pdf.
[24] Antonenko, Oksanam (2001), “Russia’s Military Involvement in the Middle East”, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol.5, No. 1, p. 36.
[25] Rivlin, Paul (2005), “The Russian Economy and Arms Exports to the Middle East”, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Vol.79, p. 36, at http//www.tau.ac.il/jcss/memoranda/memo79.pdf.
[26] Kam Ephraim (2004), From Terror to Nuclear Bombs: The Significance of the Iranian Threat, Tel Aviv: Ministery of Defense Publishing House and Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies, p. 69.
[27] Rivlin, p. 37.
[28] Ibid, p. 37.
[29] Ibid, p. 37.
[30] BBC News, Russia backs Iran Nuclear rights, , http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7046258.stm on 16 October 2007.
[31] BBC News, Russia ships nuclear fuel to Iran, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7147463.stm, on 17 December 2007.
[32] Inbar, Efraim (2006), “The Need to Block A Nuclear Iran,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 1, p. 88.
[33] Bourtman, Ilya (2006), “Putin and Russia’s Middle Eastern Policy”, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol.10, No.2, pp. 5.
[34] Inbar, Efraim (2006), “The Need to Block A Nuclear Iran,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 1, p. 92.
[35] Inbar, Efraim (1999), “Yizhak Rubin and Israel’s National Security, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 119.
[36] Mizin Victor (2004), “The Russian-Iran Nuclear Connection and U.S. Policy Options,”, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No.1, p.76.
[37] Ganji, Barak (2006), “Iran & Israel: Asymmetric Warfare and Regional Strategy,” Conflict Studies Research Center, Middle East Series, 06/49, p. 4, at www.da.mod.uk/colleges/csrc/document-listings/middle-east/06(49)BG.pdf
[38] Inbar, Efraim (2006), “The Need to Block A Nuclear Iran,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 1, p. 93.
[39] Ibid, p. 88.
[40] Judith S. Yaphe and Charles D. Lutes (2005), “Reassessing the Implication of Nuclear Armed-Iran,” McNair Paper, No. 69, Washington D.C: National Defense University, pp.27-28, at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/mcnair/mcnair69/McNairPDF.