Russia's relation with Israel and Iran

Russia’s Relations with Israel and Iran: Shaping New Dimensions
Priya Ranjan Kumar*

Since the 1990s, Russia and Israel have established considerably good relation in multi-dimensional aspects. Both have improved the trade relation in various fields including agricultural products, medicine, energy, Science and technology etc. They established a joint commission on trade. Both have joint mechanism in the field of combating terrorism as well. Interestingly, on the other hand Russia’s relation with Iran strengthened in different fields which include arms trade, science and technology (nuclear) etc. However, Israel perceives Iran as the threat to its national security because of Iran’s perpetual support to Hezbollah and controversial Iranian Nuclear programme where as Russia’s strategic considerations towards Iran links with the economic security in terms of hard currency. These confronting interests of Russia and Israel towards Iran put Moscow to approach both countries in the new dimensions in order to secure its national interest without sacrificing the vital interests from any of the side.

Since the 1990s, Russia and Israel have established considerably good relation in multi-dimensional aspects. Both have improved the trade relation in various fields including agricultural products, medicine, energy, Science and technology etc. They established a joint commission on trade. Both have joint mechanism in the field of combating terrorism as well. However, Russia has sought to achieve three major goals in the West Asian region. The first is to demonstrate Russia’s renewed power and influence in the region where American influence is on the decline. The second is to increase trade with the nations of the region, so as to buttress to Russian economy, especially its non-energy sectors. The third goal is to minimize Arab, Turkish and Iranian support for the Chechen rebellion against Russian control, which the rebels are carrying out in the name of Islam.[1]

Furthermore, Internationally, despite its economic and social crises, Russia’s policymakers have aimed at relatively modest goal of “a multi-polar system of international relations that reflects the diversity of the present-day world and its diverse interest in a real way.” As Yevgeny Primakov, advocated, “For Russia, the transition to a multi-polar world will create the possibility of diversifying the directions of foreign policy and of developing constructive strategic relations immediately with some influential partners this increases the possibility of a manoeuvre necessary for ensuring the country’s security under the conditions of a resource deficit and of the transition period in the development of our country, which is attended by difficulties”.[2]
Internal factors also drive Russia’s West Asian engagement. The rise of separatist hotspots- foremost among them being the protracted Chechen conflict- has focused its attention on the West Asia’s growing ability to influence politics in Russia as well as in its “near abroad”- the Caucasus and Southern Eurasia. So Russia engages Iran, in part to keep it from aggravating Russia’s escalating struggle with militant Islam in the Caucasus. Russian policymakers began to stress, “Iran can have both stabilizing and a destabilizing role on the Muslim regions of Russia. We need a broad spectrum of co-operation with Iran. The broader the co-operation, the narrower is the possibility of anti Russian actions from extremist forces in Iran”[3]. Russia’s relations with Israel and Iran would be discussed separately in these foreign policy orientations.
Russia’s Relations with Israel
Traditionally, The Union of Socialist Soviet Republic (USSR), the predecessor of Russia was the first power to extend de jure recognition to the state of Israel on 18 May 1948. Although the United States (US) preceded the USSR in endorsing the Jewish State, it had only accorded de facto recognition. However, one can argue that this was a turning point in the Soviet policy towards Israel because of the two strategic and ideological considerations. Strategic considerations focused upon Soviet desire to end Britain’s role and influence from West Asia. Other was ideological consideration whereby the Soviet Union viewed the emerging state of Israel as potentially a true “people’s democracy”. As such, it deserved support in the competition that was taking place between the “socialist and imperialist system”.[4]
Interestingly, this friendly attitude did not last and both sides were responsible for the worsening of relations. Some of the actions taken by Israel in the period between May 1948 and February 1953 impacted negatively upon its relation with the USSR. These included requests for loans and economic aid from the US and voting with the West at the United Nations, notably on Korea in 1950 and on the US Mutual Security Act in 1951. An anti-Soviet tone in the Israeli press may also have caused damage. Other factors, which worsened the relationship, were not directly connected with Israel but rather, emanated from the outbreak of the Cold War. The USSR’s relations with the Western powers or with the Arab States were influenced by Soviet and Arab relation with the West. The USSR viewed itself as the champion workers’ of the world and the centre for the global fight against capitalism and imperialism. It regarded Israel as an ally of the forces that was fighting.[5] Moreover, Suez Canal crisis in 1956 witnessed the deterioration of the relation while the June war of 1967 led to end the diplomatic relationship between the USSR and Israel.
At the same time both maintained good communications through various direct and indirect channels. There was also backdoor diplomacy, for example, in September 1977 two envoys flew from the USSR to hold secret meetings with Prime Minster Menachem Begin and Israeli and Soviet ambassadors were periodically authorised to conduct private meetings in Vienna or other European capitals.[6] Interestingly, Israel never wanted to break off relationship with the USSR because of the substantial Jewish population in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In the late 1980s Mickhail Gorbachev brought about drastic changes in the policy towards Israel. First, in 1986 the Soviet exchanged consular delegations with Israel and by early 1991, it was upgraded as Consulate General and Israel did the same in the USSR. However, only on the eve the Madrid Peace Conference that full diplomatic relation between the two countries was restored in October 1991. The USSR also decided to support the US-led initiative in December 1991 to repeal the 1975 UN General Assembly resolution equating Zionism with racism.[7] The USSR also allowed the resumption of massive Jewish immigration to Israel. Cultural contacts between the two expanded dramatically and many famous Soviet artists, writers and musicians visited Israel. Unpredictably, once Gorbachev stated that the absence of Soviet-Israeli relations was abnormal.[8]
Practically, Russian interests in Israel have been four-fold. The primary interest is economic. The Second major Russian interest is diplomatic. By maintaining good ties with Israel, Russia apparently hopes to keep a door open to the Washington especially when Russia-American ties become strained, as happened during 1994-1996. Thirdly, a close ties with Israel also enabled Russia to play, or at least appeared to play, a major role in the Arab-Israeli peace process. The fourth Russian interest was a cultural one. With more than a million immigrants (constitute approximately 20% of the Israeli population) from the former Soviet Union, almost all of them Russian-speaking, Israel has the largest Russian Diaspora outside the former Soviet Union. There are extensive cultural ties between the two countries, with Israel hosting a large number of Russian artists, pop singers, newspapers, and even cable TV programmes.[9]
The most important area of cooperation between Russia and Israel have been trade and science and technology. Russia has been recognised as one of the priority countries by Israel for promotion of the exports and of the bilateral trade in general. Several agreements were signed in the field of economic and technical cooperation between the two countries. It includes, trade and economic, scientific and technical cooperation, healthcare and medical science, agriculture and associated industries, tourism, postal and electric communication, culture and education civil aviation and prevention of double taxation. Russia and Israel have signed an inter-ministerial Memorandum on Mutual Understanding on Cooperation in the Field of Perfecting of professional and Language Training of Diplomatic Personal on 13 August 1998. On 25 March 1999, they added an intergovernmental Programme of Cultural Cooperation. They also negotiated an agreement on investment protection, in the area of standardization on the governmental level.
In addition, the other areas of potential cooperation between both countries have been in the transport of energy (particularly oil). Israel has a 42–inch diameter oil pipeline between Eilat on the Red Sea and Ashkelon that was built on the Mediterranean. This is believed to have a capacity of 400,000 b/d, with possible expansion to 1-1.2 million b/d (and 18 million barrels of storage capacity). In 2003, the Eilat-Ashkelon Pipeline Company completed a project that would enable oil to be piped southwards, with the aim of making it available to Russia. The pipeline would enable Russia to sell its oil in South and Southeast Asia with lower shipment costs than those incurred by using the Suez Canal or the proposed Egyptian SUMED (Suez-Mediterranean pipeline) pipeline.[10] In addition, since the early 1990s Israel’s dependence on Russian energy has increased. Following June 2004 meeting between Alexey Miller, the Chairman of Gazprom and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Israel promised to increase import of energy from one percent of its demand to as high as to 25 percent by 2025.[11] Trade between both countries has doubled under Putin and it was close to $1.5 billion in direct trade and over a billion in energy deals. Russia and Israel are working together in heavy industry, aviation, energy, and medicine.

In Strategic aspects, since 1991, the security cooperation between the Russia and Israel blossomed into military cooperation. In December 1995, Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev made an official visit to Israel, meeting Prime Minister Shimon Peres and Chief of Staff Amnon Shahak. He also visited the Ramat David Air Forces, Israel’s state military industries, Yad Vashem (the Holocaust Museum and Memorial), and Yitzhak Rabin’s grave. During his visit, he signed a five-year bilateral agreement for military-technical cooperation (which was extended in 2000). Both signed a Memorandum on Mutual Understanding in Military Cooperation, which envisaged the development of contact between the defence ministries of the two countries.[12] Since then Israel and Russia have pursued military cooperation that envisaged the development of contact between the Defence Ministries of the both countries.[13]

In May 1997, Russian Interior Minister Viktor Kulikov came to Israel on a five-day visit with the purpose of strengthening security cooperation between the two countries in the areas of organized crime and terrorism. Kulikov signed an agreement with Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy for the establishment of a permanent office of the Russian Interior Ministry at the Russian Embassy in Tel-Aviv and the establishment of an office for the Israel’s Interior Ministry at the Israeli Embassy in Moscow. Both countries signed an agreement for joint action to maintain security on airline flights. On 20 June 1997, the Russian arms sale agency, Rozvooruzheniye signed an agreement with Israeli aircraft industries to jointly produce the A-50 radar early warning aircraft (AWACS). Under the agreement, Russia would do 90 percent of the work on the airframe while Israel would supply the radar system. There was also discussion for the joint modernization of Russian MIG-21 and MIG-29 fighter planes.[14]

Cooperation has also extended to the realm of space technology. In 1998 Israel launched the Techsat-2 with the help of a Russian rocket launcher. Photo images were transmitted by EROS-A (Earth Remote Observation System), a commercial satellite made by Israel Aircraft Industries and Launched from Siberia in December 2000. In the spring of 2003, the Russian and Israeli Defence Ministries signed two agreements covering intellectual property, designed in part to protect Russian rights when Israel sells Russian-made platforms with its military technology added to them.[15]

The most visible area of cooperation between Russia and Israel have been in counter-terrorism. Israel was one of the first countries to support Russia after the Beslan tragedy in 2004 where almost 300 people, mostly children, were killed in a hostage standoff with Chechan rebels. “Israel, which has been struggling against terrorism for many years, stands alongside the Russian people and sends its condolences,” Ariel Sharon stated: “There is no justification for terrorism and this is the time for the free, just and humanitarian world to unite and fight this horrific plague, which acknowledges neither borders nor limitations”.[16] This statement was not a break from the past. Since 1999, Israeli officials have stressed the similarity between Chechen and Palestinian Islamist violence and reiterated the need to respond forcefully to terrorism more broadly.

Following an onslaught of terrorist attacks between 1999 and 2004 on Russian apartment buildings, subways, airlines and theatres and inadequate and often bunged responses by security services, Russian intelligence services began serious collaboration with their counterparts in Israel. Though Mossad (Israel’s intelligence agency) officials secretly held meetings with Russians at the Kremlin during Yeltsin’s tenure and Putin’s first years in office, the level of cooperation increased dramatically in the post-Beslan security environment. As Ehud Olmert, then Israel’s Vice Prime Minister, stated in November 2004, “I think there is a growing realization in Russia that they [Russia] have to become more prepared for future terror attacks and that it’s a good idea to compare notes with us [Israeli]”.[17] Senior level talks have focused on three areas: training, border security, and arms. Since 2004, Israeli and Russian anti-terror forces have secretly trained together, and there were plans to hold joint counter-terrorism exercises. The Israeli police, by Russia’s request, also prepared reports detailing alternative responses to the hostage crises at the Nord-Ost Theater and Beslan.

On the issue of border security, Israel has proposed that Russia reform its intelligence gathering and border-protection agencies. Dmitry Kozak, Putin’s envoy to the Northern Caucasus region, had spent the majority of time since his appointment in March shuttling between Russian and Israeli signing counter-terrorism arrangements and arms deals.[18] In November 2005, for example, it was reported that Kozak had negotiated a deal whereby Israel would sell unmanned aerial vehicles to Russia to help patrol the border with Chechnya. Even the tension caused by visit to Russia by Hamas representative in March 2006 did not significantly disrupt counter-terrorism cooperation between the two countries.

Russia’s Relations with Iran
Russia perceived West Asian region as a major source of hard currency.[19] The region’s volatile politics also makes it a lucrative market for Russian arms export, vital to its struggling military-industrial complex. This has led Russia to resuscitate its Cold War patron-client relationships with countries like Syria and Iran. Finally, the convergence of interests between the official government driven by security calculation and those of powerful domestic lobbies over oil and gas has also contributed to Russia’s involvement in the region.[20] However, the multicultural composition of Russian population also became the driving force for Moscow to pursue ties with the Muslim world.
Historically, In the 1960s and 1970s, Iran was the USSR’s third largest trading partner in the developing world, after India and Egypt. Soviet arms were first supplied to the Shah in 1967. Following the refusal by the US, the USSR provided favourable credits for the Isfahan steel plant. This however, did not cause a shift in Iranian proximity from one superpower to the other in the way that the finance and construction of the Aswan dam in Egypt did. Despite some progress in the 1970s, Iran largely remained an American ally in the region. Soviet Union welcomed the Islamic Revolution of 1979, insofar as it was anti-Western. Given its close relations with Iraq, the USSR sold few weapons to Iran during the prolonged Iran-Iraq war. Between 1980and 1983, new weapons sales agreements between the two countries reached $615 million but during 1984-87 they fell to only $5 million.[21] However, after the Iran-Iraq war ended, the international embargo on Iraq pushed the Soviets closer towards Iran. In 1989, the speaker of the Iranian parliament, Hashemi Rafsanjani, signed a framework agreement in Moscow on arms supplies and cooperation in the development of nuclear energy. This was followed by a large increase in deliveries, during 1987-91 totalled $2.1 billion. With the end of the war in Afghanistan and the fall of communism, Russia became a much more attractive source of supply for Iran.[22]
Additionally, over the past decades, Russia’s military cooperation arrangements with Iran have been more extensive and Iran has emerged as the third largest client for Russian arms after China and India. Since the two countries signed a bilateral military-technical cooperation agreement in 1989 (signed with the Soviet Union but inherited by Russia), until 2001 Russia has supplied Iran with equipment and services worth over $4 billion. Among all the Russian clients in West Asia, Russia-Iranian cooperation was the most advanced in terms range of weapons systems sold by Russia and in the scale of technical cooperation. Between 1992 and 2000, Russia sold to Iran three Kilo-class submarines, over 200 T-72 tanks, ten Su-24 and eight MiG aircraft. Moreover, Iran has acquired licenses for the production of T-72C and BMP-2 armoured fighting vehicles. Russia has also provided Iran with a large number of military advisers who have trained its military, including submarine crews, to operate advanced Russian weapons systems and helped set up licensed production arrangements. Russia was suspected of helping Iran in the development of ballistic missile technology. There have been reports that Russia has sold SS-4 SSM technology and assisted in the development of a dual use communications satellite system.[23] A number of Iranian military officers were attending Russian military schools. Many private Russian citizens (some estimate more than 500) were working in Iran and were suspected of providing military-technology related expertise.[24]
In 1995, Russia and Iran signed an agreement that included a $780 million contract to build a light water nuclear reactor at Bushehr. This was project started by a West German consortium in 1974 but halted following the 1979 revolution, which ended the German involvement. About 80 percent of the construction was completed at that time. Bushehr was bombed several times by Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war. The 1995 agreement called for completion of two 1,300-MW pressurized light water units as well as the supply of two modern VVER-440 units.[25] Since then, work has proceeded at Bushehr, but not on any of the other projects agreed on.
Therefore, Russia’s military supplies and cooperation in civilian nuclear energy with Iran have become a source of constant concern and tension in Russia’s relations with Israel and the US. The US government has applied consistent pressure on Russia to reduce or even cancel some of its projects with Iran. In November 2000, the Putin government, however, decided to cancel the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement. The following month, the Russian Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev, paid the first official visit to Tehran since the 1979 revolution. In March 2001, President Khatami visited Russia and President Putin announced that Russia would conclude new arms supply agreements with Iran. A technical-military agreement to this effect was signed in October 2001.[26] At the same time, Presidents Khatami and Putin agreed to expand bilateral cooperation on nuclear power. In November 2001, Russia delivered the first reactor to Iran, and in July 2002 Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom now Rosatom) outlined a plan to build six 1,000-MW reactors in Iran by 2010, including four at Bushehr and two at Akhvaz.[27]
The US strongly opposed to nuclear cooperation project and provided Russia with information pointing to the existence of an Iranian nuclear weapons program. In May 2002, when US Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham met him, Minatom Head Alexander Rumyantsev stated that Bushehr “is not a source of proliferation of nuclear material”.[28] In June 2003, President Putin said that Russia would continue building a nuclear power station for Iran, but demanded that Iran’s nuclear programme would come under stricter international control. This statement was made a day after the Group 8 countries urged both Iran and North Korea to curb their nuclear programs. According to Putin, Russian nuclear cooperation with any country would be “based on the extent to which their programs are open and placed under the control of the IAEA” (International Atomic Energy Agency, the Vienna based nuclear watchdog). In a reference to worries of Russia's rivals he added: “We are categorically opposed to bringing in any problems which could be used for unfair competitions, including on the Iranian market”.[29]
Russian officials have stated that the Bushehr project is consistent with a civil nuclear programme, and deny US accusations that oil-rich Iran has no need for nuclear power and has been secretly trying to acquire atomic weapons. Construction on Bushehr was to be completed by March 2004, but as a result of delays-described as technical-completion was re-scheduled for 2006. In August 2004, Iran said that the plant would start operating in October 2006. In February 2005, Russia and Iran signed an agreement to return spent nuclear fuel from the Bushehr nuclear power plant, a move that paved the way for Iran to have Bushehr become operational. According to the agreement, Russia would provide the fuel needed to run the Bushehr plant, but the spent fuel would be sent back to Russia to ensure that Iran does not extract plutonium, which could be used to make a nuclear bomb.
However, Russian diplomats have been holding bilateral talks with Iranian officials on a proposal they say could defuse the crisis in 2006. The proposal, which won support from other UN Security Council members-including the US-would allow Iran to obtain enriched uranium it says it needs for civilian nuclear power directly from Russia. President Putin has offered qualified support for Iran’s nuclear programme on a visit to Tehran, he stated that “peaceful nuclear activities must be allowed”[30] and cautioned against using force to resolve the dispute over Iran in October 2007. But he was evasive when asked whether the Bushehr nuclear plant Russia is building would be finished on time or if Moscow would supply nuclear fuel. After long discussion with Iran, Russia had delivered its first shipment of nuclear fuel to reactor it is helping to build at Bushehr in Iran[31] in December 2007. Interestingly, the UN has demanded that Iran halt uranium enrichment but has approved the Russian nuclear fuel deliveries.
Israeli Concerns
Israel interprets these Russia’s dealings with Iran as a threat to its national security.[32] If Iran uses the Russian civilian nuclear technology to build a nuclear weapon, it would cause a radical shift in the regional balance of power, possibly catalyzing a regional nuclear arms race (led by Saudi Arabia and Egypt). Such a path would also lead to a nuclear stand-off between Israel and Iran. The issue of Iran looms large over in all areas of Israeli-Russian relations, so much so that Robert O. Freedman, a leading expert on Russian-Israeli relations, believes that Russia is working against Israel on all the major issues.[33] For Israel, a nuclear Iran constitutes an existential threat. It sees the tripartite combination of a radical Islamic regime, long-range missile capability, and nuclear weapons to be extremely dangerous. Due to its small and dense population, Israel is extremely vulnerable to non-conventional attacks. In December 2005, Israel’s Prime Minister Ariel Sharon termed the Iranian program “a grave threat” stressing that Israel “cannot accept a nuclear Iran.[34] This statement was a reflection of a long-held threat perception of a large part of Israel’s strategic community. Indeed, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (1992-95) already perceived “Islamic Iran which was engaged in acquiring a nuclear capability and in sponsoring terror, as Israel’s arch-enemy”.[35]
This stems from the fact the while Vladimir Putin sees his country’s dealings with Iran primarily as an economic issue, Israel views it as a security concern. More than anyone else, Russian was aware that the market for their antiquated nuclear technology was shrinking, and that the $10 billion agreement it signed in July 2002 to provide Iran with six nuclear reactors over the next decade was a deal that was desperate for the Russian nuclear industry.[36]
Moreover Israel's fears are exasperated by the election of Mahmoud Ahmedinejad in June 2005. He has contributed to Israel’s fears by issuing a series of inflammatory statements. On 26 October 2005, paraphrasing a speech made by late Ayatollah Khomeini, he called for “Israel to be wiped off the map”.[37] On 14 December 2005, in a speech that was televised live Ahmedinejad denied that the Holocaust had ever happened, suggesting that Israel’s Jews should be relocated to Europe or even to Alaska. Such statements from high-ranking public officials cannot be dismissed as pure rhetoric; they reflect a policy preference and an Iran strengthened by a nuclear arsenal might pursue such a policy.[38] In addition, Iran was allied with Syria, another state with an anti-US predisposition, and seeks to create a radical Shi’a corridor from Iran to the Mediterranean. According to the US State Department, Iran considered as the most active state sponsor of terrorism.[39]
For Russian, the nuclear issue was not high enough on its list of most pressing security concerns to jeopardize other key interests. Russia prefers the status quo and considers the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran to be an unwelcome one, but not so unwelcome as to place other Russian interests at risk. The Russians appear more concerned about an American intervention that would jeopardize Russian commercial interests; complicate bilateral relations, including those with Israel and the US; cause further regional destabilizations; and set off strategic and economic ripple effects that Russia may be ill equipped to handle.[40] Some in Russian view the Iranian nuclear programme as chiefly aimed at the US and therefore useful in countering growing American influence and adventurism. At the same time, Russian officials understand that the issue was important for its principal interlocutors, namely, the US, the UK, Germany, Germany, and France, and Russia would not want to be cut out of any scheme they propose.
Therefore, in these different confronting perspective of Israel and Russia towards Iran made the relation more suspicious. Israel perceived Russia’s closer relation with Iran as well as Syria the most dangerous for its national security. Whereas Russia’s national interest (economic security) means improved relation with Iran and Syria, particularly in the field of arms trade. These confronting interests of Russia and Israel towards Iran put Moscow to approach both countries in the new dimensions in order to secure its national interest without sacrificing the vital interests from any of the side























End Notes and References:
* Priya Ranjan Kumar, Research Scholar, Centre for West Asia and African Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University New Delhi-110067
[1] For details see, Robert O. Freedman “The Russian Resurgence in the Middle East”, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol.5, No.3, p.19-23.
[2] For details see Primakov Yevgeny (1998), “Russia and the outside World,” International Affairs, 3:
7-13.
[3] Berman, Ilan (2001), “Russia and the Mideast Vaccum”, The Institute for Advanced Strategic & Political Studies, p. 21, htt://www.iasps.org/strategic/strat12.pdf.,
[4] Kazan, Rudyard (2004), “The Israeli-Soviet/Russia Relations”, Defense Magazine, at http://lebarmy.gov.lb/article.asp?In=en&id=4203
[5] Epstein, D. Alek (2007), “Russia and Israel: A Romance Aborted?”, Russian in Global Affairs, Vol.5, No.4, p.181.
[6] Klieman S. Aaron (1990), Israel & The World After 40 Years, Washington: Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defense Publishers, Inc., p.196.
[7] Freedman O. Robert (1995), “Israeli-Russian Relations since the Collapse of The Soviet Union”, Middlle East Journal, Vol. 49, No. 2, p. 234.
[8] Polsky Yury (1994), “Russia’s Policy Towards Israel”, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.28, No. 1, p. 25.
[9] Freedman O. Robert (1998), “Russia and Israel under Yeltsin”, Israel Studies, Vol.3, No. 1, pp.148-49.
[10] Rivlin, Paul (2005), “The Russian Economy and Arms Exports to the Middle East”, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Vol.79, p.42, at http//www.tau.ac.il/jcss/memoranda/memo79.pdf.
[11] Bourtman, Ilya (2006), “Putin and Russia’s Middle Eastern Policy”, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol.10, No.2, pp.2-3.
[12] Antonenko, Oksanam (2001), “Russia’s Military Involvement in the Middle East”, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol.5, No. 1, p. 43.
[13] Freedman O. Robert (1998), “Russia and Israel under Yeltsin”, Israel Studies, Vol.3, No. 1, pp.155.
[14] Ibid, p. 161.
[15] Rivlin, Paul (2005), “The Russian Economy and Arms Exports to the Middle East”, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Vol.79, p.42, at http//www.tau.ac.il/jcss/memoranda/memo79.pdf.
[16] Leyden, Joel, “Israel to Russia: Tears for Children by Islamic Terrorism,” Israel News Agency, 5 September 2004.
[17] Bourtman, Ilya (2006), “Putin and Russia’s Middle Eastern Policy”, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol.10, No.2, pp.3.
[18] Bourtman, Ilya (2006), “Putin and Russia’s Middle Eastern Policy”, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol.10, No.2, pp. 3.
[19] Freedman O. Robert (1997), “Russian and Iran: A Tactical Alliance,” School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) Review, Vol. 17, No. 2, p.97.
[20] Berman, Ilan (2001), “Russia and the Mideast Vaccum”, The Institute for Advanced Strategic & Political Studies, p. 5, htt://www.iasps.org/strategic/strat12.pdf.,
[21] Cordesman H. Anthony and Abraham R. Wigner (1990), The Lessions of Modern War, Vol. II, The Iran-Iraq War, Boulder: Westview Press Inc. p.49
[22] Kam Ephraim (2004), From Terror to Nuclear Bombs: The Significance of the Iranian Threat, Tel Aviv: Ministery of Defense Publishing House and Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, p. 66.
[23] Rivlin, Paul (2005), “The Russian Economy and Arms Exports to the Middle East”, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Vol.79, p. 38, at http//www.tau.ac.il/jcss/memoranda/memo79.pdf.
[24] Antonenko, Oksanam (2001), “Russia’s Military Involvement in the Middle East”, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol.5, No. 1, p. 36.
[25] Rivlin, Paul (2005), “The Russian Economy and Arms Exports to the Middle East”, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Vol.79, p. 36, at http//www.tau.ac.il/jcss/memoranda/memo79.pdf.
[26] Kam Ephraim (2004), From Terror to Nuclear Bombs: The Significance of the Iranian Threat, Tel Aviv: Ministery of Defense Publishing House and Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies, p. 69.
[27] Rivlin, p. 37.
[28] Ibid, p. 37.
[29] Ibid, p. 37.
[30] BBC News, Russia backs Iran Nuclear rights, , http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7046258.stm on 16 October 2007.
[31] BBC News, Russia ships nuclear fuel to Iran, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7147463.stm, on 17 December 2007.
[32] Inbar, Efraim (2006), “The Need to Block A Nuclear Iran,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 1, p. 88.
[33] Bourtman, Ilya (2006), “Putin and Russia’s Middle Eastern Policy”, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol.10, No.2, pp. 5.
[34] Inbar, Efraim (2006), “The Need to Block A Nuclear Iran,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 1, p. 92.
[35] Inbar, Efraim (1999), “Yizhak Rubin and Israel’s National Security, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 119.
[36] Mizin Victor (2004), “The Russian-Iran Nuclear Connection and U.S. Policy Options,”, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No.1, p.76.
[37] Ganji, Barak (2006), “Iran & Israel: Asymmetric Warfare and Regional Strategy,” Conflict Studies Research Center, Middle East Series, 06/49, p. 4, at www.da.mod.uk/colleges/csrc/document-listings/middle-east/06(49)BG.pdf
[38] Inbar, Efraim (2006), “The Need to Block A Nuclear Iran,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 1, p. 93.
[39] Ibid, p. 88.
[40] Judith S. Yaphe and Charles D. Lutes (2005), “Reassessing the Implication of Nuclear Armed-Iran,” McNair Paper, No. 69, Washington D.C: National Defense University, pp.27-28, at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/mcnair/mcnair69/McNairPDF.